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Communication 
E. Van Der Zee, D. Weary,  
Communication is the transfer of information from a sender to a receiver where both the 
sender and the receiver map a signal to a particular meaning (see Hauser, 1996, for 
several other definitions). Although some may consider information transfer as anything 
that reduces the receiver‟s uncertainty about future events, such a definition implies that 
communication is a one-way system and does not take into account manipulation, or even 
the intentional ploy of the sender, in some cases to enhance the receiver‟s uncertainty 
about future events. If the signal to meaning mapping involves syntax (a formal 
structuring of the signals in relation to each other) this is termed language. 
Signal to meaning mapping does not necessarily involve intention or conscious 
processing. Plants have also been found to communicate information with each other; for 
example undamaged sugar maple seedlings and corn synthesize compounds that make 
them less palatable – or even slightly toxic - when damaged, conspecifics emit airborne 
signals when their leaves are damaged, and chemical signals can even be emitted that 
attract predators of the likely perpetrators.  
Signals may be distinguished from cues in that signals can be varied behaviourally by the 
sender (for example an animal can call or not call, as well as possibly use many varieties 
of a call), and involve some cost for the signaler to produce. In contrast, cues are 
typically always present, such as the warning or „aposomatic‟ coloration of some 
poisonous species, and there are no extra costs associated with each usage. 
In the animal kingdom every possible sensory information channel is exploited for 
communication. Sound waves are used, for example in song, grunts and calls, such as the 
low frequency calls made by elephants that travel through the ground and can be picked 
up by other elephants with their trunks and feet; visual signals are used in the form of 
colours and decoration, body language, gestures, facial expressions, light signals, dance, 
display, and even the way a nest is built and decorated, as by the hammerkop (Scorpus 
ombretta) to signal fitness to potential mates; chemical signals (see: chemical 
communication),  include pheromones which play a role in partner selection, signalling 
alarm and the setting out of trails, aversive defensive chemicals, chemical territorial 
markings and social odours such as the chemicals exchanged between lions and domestic 
cats when rubbing their heads against each other that enhance bonding; vibration is used 
for example by the southern green stinkbug (Nezara viridula) to signal both gender and 
location through the vibration of leaves attached to plants or trees; electricity is used by 
some aquatic species, for example the frequency of the electric discharge of the whale-
faced marcusenius (Brienomyrus brachyistius) is used by conspecifics to determine 
gender  (see: electric fields); and touch, for example the licking used as a greeting by 
marmosets (Callithrix jacchus).  
The specific channel used for communication depends on both the signal content, sensory 
ability of the species concerned as well as the prevailing environment for communication; 
for example pigs often use auditory signals to rapidly communicate socially as their 
natural woodland habitat is a barrier to visual signals. 
Communication is generally focused on the needs of the sender or the receiver, linked to 
the survival of the individual or the species: to find a mate, to defend, to threaten, to mark 
territory, to coordinate hunting, to determine or establish a social hierarchy, to know 
something about the state of the sender (e.g. being prepared to mate), etc. The needs of 
the sender and receiver in an evolutionary context do not require that communication is 
always truthful: senders can benefit by using signals to mislead receivers. For example, 
roosters will sometimes peck at the ground, as if foraging, even when no food is present, 
in an apparent attempt to attract hens to their vicinity. „Honest‟ signaling is more likely if 
the signals are expensive to produce. For example, crowing acts as an honest signal of 
social status in part because subordinates are more likely to be pecked by flock mates if 
they crow. 
Communication is not limited to social animals, although communication among animals 
living in groups tends to be more varied (both in channel use and the repertoires 
employed) compared to those living solitary lives. For example, Bonobos (Pan paniscus) 
use facial expressions, gestures, calls, grunts, touch, grooming and even sex in 
communication (de Waal & Lanting, 1997), while the solitary living Giant Kangaroo Rat 
(Dipodomys ingens) communicates mostly by leaving scent trails in the sand and by foot 
drumming (Murdock & Randall, 2001). 
The total repertoire of signal to meaning mappings is vast for human beings (the adult 
“mental lexicon” contains 50,000 - 100,000 words, depending on the level of education) 
compared to the signal repertoires available to other animals. For example, vervet 
monkeys living in Amboseli National Park in Kenya have three different alarm calls to 
signal danger: leopard alarm calls enticing vervets to run into the trees, eagle alarm calls 
causing vervets to look up, and snake alarm calls making vervets look down (Seafarth et 
al., 1980). Attempts have been made to artificially increase the total set of signals that are 
naturally available to chimpanzees (Hillix & Rumbaugh, 2004; Rumbaugh et al., 2003), 
dolphins (Herman et al., 1984), parrots (Pepperberg, 2000), and dogs (Kaminski et al., 
2004; Rossi & Ades, 2008). For example, a border collie named Rico, who knew the 
names for at least 200 objects (as tested by retrieving these objects), was taught almost 
forty names for new objects in single trials, and was shown to remember these new 
names after a period of four weeks, making his performance “comparable to the 
performance of three-year-old toddlers” (Kaminski et al., 2004). Although the human like 
ability of “fast mapping” was claimed for the process of name acquisition by Rico, 
methodological problems in this and other animal studies have not refuted the suggestion 
that the size, structure, use and acquisition of the mental lexicon in humans is 
qualitatively different compared to other animals. The human mental lexicon encodes 
among other things complex relations (e.g., „later‟ and „conclusion‟), abstract categories 
(e.g., „planets‟ and „recursive‟), and syntactic features (e.g., „gender‟ and „number‟). With 
the (spontaneous) intention to convey a message humans normally produce 2-3 words per 
second without repeating the same item and while making only 1-2 mistakes per 1000 
words. Humans learn signal to meaning mappings by using a theory of mind to 
understand word-reference (e.g. to understand pointing, or to understand what the 
signaller attends to), humans do not have to be taught which items should be learned from 
among the total available input (e.g., “this is not a car” does not contain a reference to a 
name (“not-a-car”) for an entity), and humans learn words without reinforcement 
(Bloom, 2004; Markman & Abelev, 2004). Although research continues to investigate to 
what extent these and other features are part of the signal to meaning mapping in other 
species, it is quite unlikely that all the features found in humans will be found in any 
single other species, due to differences in the evolutionary histories of humans and non-
humans, including our closest primate cousins. 
Most signals evolved for communication between members of the same species, but 
some signals are also used for inter-specific communication. For example, prey species 
use a variety of signals in response to the presence of potential predators, such as „alarm 
calls‟ by chipmunks or „stotting‟ by gazelles (see: alarm reaction). These signals may 
have evolved as a way of warning group mates, but they also function to inform predators 
that their presence is known and that the probability of success is therefore low. By 
attending to such signals the predator saves the costs associated with (unsuccessful) 
pursuit. 
It is generally accepted that signals evolved by natural selection out of behaviours that 
had non-signal functions (Hauser, 1996). E.g,., urinating has in some species developed 
into a signal for territory marking. Although historically emphasis has been given to the 
role of selection operating mostly on the sender to convey unambiguous information for 
the recipient, during competitive interactions selection also operates “against individuals 
using displays that are highly predictive of their subsequent behaviour” (Hauser, 1996). 
While it is in the interest of the sender to deceive and to manipulate the truthfulness of a 
signal, it is in the interest of the receiver to decode a signal reliably, and to resist any 
manipulation successfully. In studying the evolution of communication, and in comparing 
the signal to meaning mappings between different species it is important to focus on both 
senders and receivers, and on both truthful and deceitful aspects of communication (see: 
deceit behaviour and honest signals). 
For people working with animals, an understanding of their signals is especially 
important, and arguably many of the animals that we have domesticated have become 
proficient at recognizing the signals we use (see: dog). Although, there appear to be some 
common properties to certain signals (for example, short high pitched rising tones tend to 
be used by humans to communicate the need to speed up across taxa, and longer low 
descending tones tend to be used to inhibit behaviour), similar signals may also be used 
quite differently between taxa, for example the bearing of teeth by a human may 
represent a friendly smile, but a similar gesture by a dog can have a defensive/aggressive 
meaning. A failure to appreciate this is believed to be one factor contributing to the 
higher rate of dog bite injuries in children (see also: bite prevention programmes).  
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